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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Vance A. Watkins appeals from his conviction for lewd and lascivious 
conduct with a child under the age of 16. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
A grand jury indicted Watkins for lewd and lascivious conduct with a child 
for having sex with his six-year-old daughter. (#35687 R., pp.17-18; see #35687 
Tr. Vol.Ill, p. 31, L. 24 - p. 34, L. 1.) A jury convicted Watkins after a trial. 
(#35687 R., p. 121; #35687 Tr. Vol.Ill, p. 248, Ls. 1-16.) On appeal the Idaho 
Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had erred in admitting hearsay 
testimony establishing foundation for DNA evidence showing Watkins' DNA on 
the inside of a condom, both the victim's and Watkins' DNA on the outside of the 
same condom, and that Watkins' semen was in the victim's underwear. State v. 
Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, 423-27, 224 P.3d 485, 490-94 (2009). 1 The Court 
remanded for a new trial. ld..c at 427, 224 P.3d at 494. 
At the new trial, during cross examination based upon testimony given at 
the first trial about where he found the used condom, witness Officer Archuleta 
referenced a transcript and then asked the trial judge, "can I say that because I 
1 The hearsay in question came from the out-of-court statements of lab 
technician Kermit Channell to establish "chain of custocfy, Channell's testing 
methodology, and to identify the locations on the condom and panties on which 
Watkins' and the victim's DNA were found." Watkins, 148 Idaho at 427, 224 P.3d 
at 494. At the re-trial Channell testified about these things in person. (Trial Tr., 
p. 377, L. 3 - p. 437, L. 23.) 
1 
was told I can't talk about the prior trial." (Trial Tr., p. 88, Ls. 13-20.2) The trial 
judge asked if Officer Archuleta recalled making a different statement in prior 
testimony, to which the officer replied he did not recall making a different 
statement and stated he had read "the transcript of the prior trial after the 
appeals court." (Trial Tr., p. 88, L. 21 - p. 89, L. 1.) 
Although Watkins registered no objection, at that time the court on its own 
excused the jury and raised the issue of "the jury [having] been informed that 
there [was] a previous trial and an appeal in the case." (Trial Tr., p. 89, Ls. 2-11.) 
The district court ultimately concluded that prejudice from the comments about 
the prior trial and appeal could be sufficiently cured by an instruction to not 
speculate about the results of the trial, and therefore a fair trial could still be had. 
(Trial Tr., p. 106, L. 5 - p. 111, L. 9.) The court based its ruling on the finding 
that the jury had been informed of a prior trial and appeal, but were not informed 
of any conviction. (Trial Tr., p. 107, L. 19 - p. 108, L. 1; p. 109, Ls. 10-13.) The 
district court then instructed the jury to not speculate as to the result of the 
previous trial. (Trial Tr., p. 115, L. 18 - p. 116, L. 1. 3) 
The defense continued its cross examination of Officer Archuleta, wherein 
the officer acknowledged that his prior testimony (that he found the condom 
discussed at trial in a closed trash bag under some papers) was accurate. (Trial 
2 The volume of transcript containing the trial also contains pre-trial motions and 
the sentencing. Each segment of the transcript begins with page 1. Citations to 
the "Trial Tr.," are therefore to the pages of the actual trial transcript, and not to 
portions of the transcript addressing of pre-trial motions or sentencing. 
3 The trial court also offered to strike the statements once the jury returned, but 
the defense declined this offer. (Trial Tr., p. 112, Ls. 3-14.) 
2 
. Tr., p. 116, L. 19 - p. 119, L. 20.) The defense subsequently argued that the 
victim's DNA could have gotten on the condom while it was in the trash. (Trial 
Tr., p. 507, L. 13 - p. 509, L. 14; p. 521, Ls. 9-16.) 
The jury returned a guilty verdict. (Trial Tr., p. 532, L. 17 - p. 533, L. 11.) 




Watkins states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Watkins' motion for a 
mistrial, made after a State's witness revealed that Mr. Watkins had 
had [sic] an earlier trial and appeal in this case? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 8.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Watkins failed to show that the district court's curative instruction, 
instructing the jury to not speculate on the outcome of the prior trial, was 
insufficient to cure potential prejudice caused by a witness' statement that there 
had been a prior trial and an appeal? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
Watkins Has Failed To Show That The District Court's Curative Instruction Was 
Insufficient To Cure Potential Preiudice Caused By A Witness' Statement That 
There Had Been A Prior Trial And An Appeal 
A. Introduction 
The district court concluded that, because there had been no testimony of 
a conviction, potential prejudice from the statements that there had been a prior 
trial and appeal could be cured by instructing the jury to not speculate about the 
results of the prior trial, and therefore a fair trial was still possible and a mistrial 
was not necessary. (Trial Tr., p. 106, L. 5 - p. 111, L. 9.) Because there was not 
an overwhelming probability that the jury ignored the court's curative instruction 
and the fact of a prior trial is not prejudicial, much less that such information is 
devastating to the defense, the district court was within its discretion to deny the 
a mistrial. Watkins argues, without addressing the curative instruction and 
making the baseless factual claim that the jury was informed that there was a 
prior conviction, that there was no harmless error. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-16.) 
Because Watkins does not address the only relevant legal question-whether the 
curative instruction was sufficient to preserve the fairness of the trial-he has 
failed to show error. If the relevant question is addressed on appeal, the record 
supports the district court's determination that the curative instruction did mitigate 
any potential prejudice such that the trial was ultimately fair. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that the applicable standard of 
review for denial of a mistrial is for an abuse of discretion: "Whether a trial court 
5 
should grant a mistrial is a matter of discretion. In the absence of an abuse of 
discretion this Court will not overturn the trial court's denial of a mistrial." State v. 
Kuzmichev, 132 Idaho 536, 544, 976 P.2d 462, 470 (1999) (quotes and brackets 
omitted). The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that calling the applicable 
standard of review an abuse of discretion is a misnomer: 
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably 
exercised his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the 
mistrial motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether 
the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented 
reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record. Thus, 
where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the 
"abuse of discretion" standard is a misnomer. The standard, more 
accurately stated, is one of reversible error. [The appellate court's] 
focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that 
triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to declare a 
mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, 
constituted reversible error. 
State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho 54, 57, 855 P.2d 891, 894 (Ct. App. 1993). Under 
the standard as articulated by the Idaho Court of Appeals, the appellate court 
reviews the full record to determine if the event that triggered the motion for 
mistrial "represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full 
record." State v. Rodriquez, 106 Idaho 30, 33, 674 P .2d 1029, 1032 (Ct. App. 
1983) (internal quotation omitted). 
C. Watkins Has Failed To Show An Overwhelming Probability That The Jury 
Was Unable To Follow The Court's Curative Instruction And A Strong 
Likelihood That The Evidence Was Devastating To His Case 
"The admission of improper evidence does not automatically require the 
declaration of a mistrial." State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 498, 198 P.3d 128, 
136 (Ct. App. 2008). "On appeal, [Watkins] has the burden of showing that the 
6 
trial court's refusal to declare a mistrial constituted reversible error." State v. 
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,601,768 P.2d 1331, 1334 (1989). To do this he must 
overcome the presumption that the jury followed the court's curative instruction . 
.!!t.; see also State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 631, 97 P.3d 1014, 1020 (Ct. App. 
2004); State v. Keyes, 150 Idaho 543, _, 248 P.3d 1278, 1279-80 (Ct. App. 
2011). He can overcome this presumption only if he shows that "there is an 
'overwhelming probability' that the jury will be unable to follow the court's 
instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be 
'devastating' to the defendant." Hill, 140 Idaho at 631, 97 P.3d at 1020 (quoting 
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987)); see also State v. Norton, 151 
Idaho 176, _, 254 P.3d 77, 94-95 (Ct. App. 2011). 
Watkins has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating on appeal an 
overwhelming probability that the jury disregarded the district court's instruction 
and a strong likelihood that the reference to the prior trial and appeal was 
devastating to his defense. Instead of addressing whether evidence of a prior 
trial and appeal were prejudicial in light of the curative jury instruction, Watkins 
relies on cases holding that evidence of a prior conviction for the same criminal 
act is highly prejudicial (while acknowledging that evidence of a prior trial, by 
itself, is at least far less prejudicial). (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-13.) He then 
combines this with his belief that knowledge of a prior trial and appeal "likely led 
the jurors to believe that Mr. Watkins had previously been found guilty, by 
another jury, for the same crime for which he was on trial in this case" and 
asserts the "testimony was so prejudicial as to have undermined Mr. Watkins 
7 
[sic] right to a fair trial and, thus, required declaration of a mistrial." (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 14-15.) Watkins then concludes: "Given the tremendously prejudicial 
effect of informing the jury that Mr. Watkins was previously found guilty by a 
different jury, it simply cannot be said that the jury's guilty verdict in this case 
'was surely unattributable' to Officer Archuleta's testimony." (Appellant's brief, p. 
16.) 
Watkins' argument fails to meet his appellate burden. First, Watkins 
makes no argument based on the relevant authority, and has therefore failed to 
carry his appellate burden of showing an abuse of discretion. Second, Watkins' 
argument merely assumes facts contrary to the record and the district court's 
findings. Because his argument is premised upon non-existent facts, it 
necessarily fails to meet his appellate burden. Finally, applying the correct legal 
standard to the actual facts shows no abuse of discretion in denying a mistrial 
based upon the curative instruction given by the court. 
To show reversible error in the trial court's denial of a mistrial where, as 
here, a curative instruction has been given in response to the presentation of 
inadmissible evidence, Watkins must show an overwhelming probability that the 
curative instruction was not followed and that the inadmissible evidence was 
devastating to the defense. Greer, 483 U.S. at 766 n.8; Norton, 151 Idaho at 
_, 254 P.3d at 94-95; Hill, 140 Idaho at 631, 97 P.3d at 1020. At no point in 
his statement of the law does Watkins acknowledge the central role of a curative 
instruction in determining whether he ultimately received a fair trial. (See 
Appellant's brief, pp. 9-13.) At no point in his argument does he provide analysis 
8 
whether evidence of a prior trial and appeal is prejudicial in light of the court's 
curative instruction. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 9-16.) Rather, Watkins 
articulates only the harmless error standard applicable if the court had actually 
erred by admitting the inadmissible evidence. (Appellant's brief, p. 13 (citing 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 24 (1967) (constitutional error must be harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt).) Because Watkins has failed to present authority or 
argument addressing the relevant legal standard, he has failed to meet his 
appellate burden of showing an abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
Second, Watkins' taking as "given" that the jury was informed of his prior 
conviction fails to show an abuse of discretion because it is directly contrary to 
the record and the trial court's findings. Watkins asserts as fact that the jury was 
informed that he had been convicted in the prior trial and relies on that "fact" as 
the foundation for his appellate argument. (Appellant's brief, p. 16 ("Given the 
tremendously prejudicial effect of informing the jury that Mr. Watkins was 
previously found guilty by a different jury .... ").) This "fact" is unsupportable in 
the record. Officer Archuleta mentioned having reviewed the transcript of the 
prior trial after the appeal. (Trial Tr., p. 88, L. 13 - p. 89, L. 1.) The district court 
found that the jury was informed of the prior trial and appeal but not informed of a 
conviction. (Trial Tr., p. 107, L. 19 - p. 108, L. 1; p. 109, Ls. 10-13.) Watkins 
does not challenge this finding of fact as clearly erroneous; rather he merely 
asserts a completely contrary fact as "given." His argument is directly contrary to 
the facts as established by the record. 
9 
Nor is this "given" fact supportable by inferences from the record. Rather 
than being "given," his assertion that the jury knew of his conviction and was 
therefore prejudiced rests on the assumption that the jury did exactly what it was 
told it should not do: speculate on the outcome of the previous trial. (Compare 
Tr., p. 115, L. 22 - p. 116, L. 1 ("You are not to speculate as to the result of that 
previous trial.").) Watkins' argument that he was prejudiced fails because it is 
based on an unsupportable factual claim. 
Finally, application of the law to the facts of this case shows no abuse of 
discretion by the trial court in denying a mistrial. To overcome the presumption 
that the jury followed the instruction Watkins has the burden of showing both an 
overwhelming probability that the jury was unable to follow the instruction to not 
speculate about the outcome of the prior trial and appeal, and a strong likelihood 
that the evidence there had been a prior trial and appeal was devastating to the 
defense. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987); State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 
625,631, 97 P.3d 1014, 1020 (Ct. App. 2004). Watkins has not even attempted 
to meet that burden. Should this Court decide to reach the merits of the district 
court's ruling despite Watkins' failure, analysis of the actual facts of this case 
under the applicable law shows no abuse of discretion. 
As noted above, the jury was informed that there had been a prior trial and 
appeal but never informed that there had been a conviction. Although evidence 
that a prior trial was held is irrelevant and therefore inadmissible, it is not, of 
itself, prejudicial. State v. Tate, 288 A.2d 494, 497 (R.I. 1972) (officer's testimony 
that he had possession of evidence except when he brought it to the court 
10 
"during the last trial" was not prejudicial); State v. Endres, 7 41 S.W.2d 788, 791 
(Mo. App. E.D. 1987) (defendant not prejudiced by single mention of prior trial). 
Rather, the reference to a prior trial is only prejudicial where the jury may draw 
an inference that there has been a prior conviction. See State v. Weidul, 649 
A.2d 318 (Me. 1994) (applying rule that jury knowledge of a prior trial is not per 
se prejudicial and rejecting claim that references to the prior trial led to inferences 
of a prior conviction). The difference between a jury learning of a prior trial and a 
prior conviction is therefore "significant." People v. Fears, 962 P.2d 272, 281 
(Colo. App. 1997). 
Here the jury learned only of the prior trial and appeal. They did not learn 
of any conviction. The court specifically instructed the jury not to speculate about 
the outcome of the prior trial. Although jury knowledge of a prior conviction is 
prejudicial, knowledge of a prior trial is not itself prejudicial. Because the jury 
would have had to completely disregard the trial court's instruction to conclude 
that there had been a prior conviction, there was no prejudice unless the jury did 
completely disregard the instruction. There is no reason on the record to suggest 
a high probability that the jury did so, and therefore the record supports no 
finding that the district court abused its discretion by holding that the curative 
instruction was adequate to preserve Watkins' right to a fair trial. 
To show an abuse of discretion in the denial of a mistrial Watkins had the 
burden of showing an overwhelming probability that the jury disregarded the trial 
court's instruction to not speculate about the outcome of the prior trial. He has 
made no attempt on appeal to do so, and has therefore failed to meet his burden. 
11 
In addition, his attempt to show error is based on a representation of fact without 
support in the record and directly contrary to the uncontested factual finding 
made by the trial court. Finally, because the only way Watkins could have 
suffered prejudice was if the jury drew an inference specifically prohibited by the 
curative instruction, and because the record shows no high likelihood that the 
jury disregarded the instruction, the record shows no abuse of discretion in 
denying a mistrial because of the reference to the prior trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
denying a mistrial. 
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